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INTERNATIONAL LAW-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION. JAPANESE CORPORATION FORMED UNDER UNITED
STATES LAW MUST COMPLY WITH TERMS OF TITLE VII OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).*
Plaintiffs were female clerical employees of defendant corpora-
tion, a wholly owned subsidiary of a Japanese trading corporation.
The plaintiffs, individually and as representatives in a class action
suit, alleged that only male Japanese citizens were hired to fill ex-
ecutive and managerial positions in violation of title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 relating to employment discrimination.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that
these employment practices were exempt from title VII coverage
by the employment provisions of article VIII(l) of the Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between Japan and the
United States (Friendship Treaty).2 The district court refused to
*Due to a clerical error which was not recognized until the case reached the Supreme
Court, Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. is the official name of the case at the
district court and appellate court levels. The official name of the case at the Supreme Court
level is Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. Any further action on remand will be
denominated under the name Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), commonly known as title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, states:
(a) It shall be an unlawful practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge an individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
ual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any indi-
vidual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
"The language of title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of em-
ployment opportunities and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which
have fostered racially stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
' Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, United States-Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, 4
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863 [hereinafter cited as Friendship Treaty].
Article VIII(1) of the Friendship Treaty states:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage, within
the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, execu-
tive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice. Moreover,
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dismiss the title VII claim, holding that since article XXII(3) of
the Friendship Treaty permitted the defendant to be incorporated
under the laws of the United States,' Article VIII(l) of the Friend-
ship Treaty did not apply.4 However, the district court certified for
interlocutory appeal5 the question of whether any of the other pro-
visions of the Friendship Treaty exempted defendant from title
VII compliance.0 The court of appeals reversed in part, holding
that article VI(4), article VII(l), and article VII(4) of the Friend-
ship Treaty, made article VIII of the Friendship Treaty applicable
to United States subsidiaries of foreign companies, but that noth-
ing in the Friendship Treaty prohibited title VII coverage.7 On cer-
such nationals and companies shall be permitted to engage accountants and other
technical experts regardless of the extent to which they may have qualified for the
practice of a profession within the territories of such other Party, for the particu-
lar purpose of making examinations, audits and technical investigations exclu-
sively for, and rendering reports to, such nationals and companies in connection
with the planning and operation of their enterprises, and enterprises in which
they have a financial interest, within such territories.
Id. art. VIII(l), 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
Article XXII(3) of the Friendship Treaty states:
As used in the present Treaty, the term "companies" means corporations, part-
nerships, companies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability
and whether or not for pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applica-
ble laws and regulations within the territories of either Party shall be deemed
companies thereof and shall have their juridical status recognized within the terri-
tories of the other Party.
Id. art. XXII(3), 4 U.S.T. at 2079-80.
' Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Arti-
cle XXII(3) would seemingly conflict with federal jurisdictional authority which mandates
that a corporation is a citizen of the state where it has been incorporated and of the state
where its principal place of business is located. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(c), 1441(a) (1976).
28 U.S.C.A. § 1292(b) (1976). An interlocutory appeal is a court of appeals' review of a
district court order before a final judgment is reached. See, 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, §§ 3929-3931 (1976).
' Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, No. 77-5641 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 1979) (order grant-
ing interlocutory appeal). The interlocutory appeal is unreported, but is mentioned by the
Second Circuit in a footnote. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 553
n. 2 (2d Cir. 1981).
' Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 555-58 (2d Cir. 1981).
Article VI(4) of the Friendship Treaty states:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall in no case be accorded, within the
territories of the other Party, less than national treatment and most-favored-na-
tion treatment with respect to the matters set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the
present Article. Moreover, enterprises in which nationals and companies of either
Party have a substantial interest shall be accorded, within the territories of the
other Party, not less than national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment
in all matters relating to the taking of privately owned enterprises into public
ownership and to the placing of such enterprises under public control.
Article VII(1) of the Friendship Treaty states:
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tiorari, held, reversed and remanded. Defendant was not covered
by article VIII(l) of the Friendship Treaty and was, therefore, a
New York corporation subject to title VII coverage. Avagliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 2374 (1982).
Early international treaties regarding corporations were primar-
ily concerned with the business rights of foreign individuals in
those corporations since, at that time, the corporate form was un-
derdeveloped.' The foreign country used a crude form of "piercing
the corporate veil" to evaluate the entrepreneur behind the enter-
prise in order to determine whether the corporation would be al-
lowed to do business.9 As a result, commercial treaties outlined
rights and privileges to be granted to "citizens" or "subjects."' 0 As
corporations grew in scope and power into entities separate from
individuals, treaties became more sophisticated in recognizing dif-
ferent corporate forms, yet still remained protective of local inter-
ests.1 Treaties had to be negotiated to overcome the nationalistic
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment
with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and other
business activities within the territories of the other Party, whether directly or by
agent or through the medium of any form of lawful juridical entity. Accordingly,
such nationals and companies shall be permitted within such territories: (a) to
establish and maintain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other establish-
ments appropriate to the conduct of their business; (b) to organize companies
under the general company laws of such other Party, and to acquire majority in-
terests in companies of such other Party; and (c) to control and manage enter-
prises which they have established or acquired. Moreover, enterprises which they
control, whether in the form of individual proprietorships, companies or other-
wise, shall, in all that relates to the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded
treatment no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises controlled by na-
tionals and companies of such other Party.
Article VII(4) of the Friendship Treaty states:
Nationals and companies of either Party, as well as enterprises controlled by
such nationals and companies, shall in any event be accorded most-favored-nation
treatment with reference to the matters treated in the present Article.
Friendship Treaty, supra note 2, arts. VI(4), VII(l), (4), 4 U.S.T. at 2069-70.
8 See Walker, Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 Am. J.
INT'L L. 373, 374-78 (1956).
9Id.
" See Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 22, 1894, United States-Japan, art. H,
29 Stat. 848, 849, T.S. No. 192. ("The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting
Parties may trade in any part of the territories of the other .. . either in person or by
agents, singly or in partnership with foreigners or native citizens or subjects.")
" See, e.g., Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, United States-Japan, art.
VII, 37 Stat. 1504, 1506, T.S. No. 558 [hereinafter cited as 1911 Treaty of Commerce and
Navigation]. ("The foregoing stipulation has no bearing upon the question whether a com-
pany or association organized in one of the two countries will or will not be permitted to
transact its business or industry in the other, this permission remaining always subject to
the laws and regulations enacted or established in the respective countries or in any part
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prejudice12 of the host nation against the foreign company.13 Diplo-
mats created concepts of "national treatment"14 and "most favored
nation treatment"15 to supersede the inconsistent regulations in
the host nation.' 6 These concepts were designed primarily to pro-
mote and facilitate reciprocal trade between signatory nations,
with an important feature being the grant of extraterritorial au-
thority to foreign corporations to form domestic subsidiaries.
7
The 1953 Friendship Treaty provided a bilateral framework for
international relations in the field of multinational corporations.'"
thereof.")
" The Supreme Court initially addressed the problem of transboundary incorporation in
Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). Bank of Augusta held that a foreign
corporation is not a protected citizen under article IV § 2 of the United States Constitution,
the privileges and immunities clause. Corporations can have no legal existence outside the
boundaries of the sovereignty in which they are created. Treaties were needed to grant legal
status to corporations abroad. The influence of Bank of Augusta on corporate formation has
been lessened by time and circumstances. For a discussion of the decline in the application
of the privileges and immunities clause, see Campbell, Jurisdiction over Non-resident Indi-
viduals and Foreign Corporations: The Privileges and Immunities Clause, 36 TUL. L. REv.
663 (1962).
" "In the treaties antedating World War II, corporations in the United States were spe-
cifically assured only small protection against possible discriminatory treatment in foreign
countries." Commercial Treaties: Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on For-
eign Relations on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United
States and Colombia, Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, and Greece, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. at
4-5 (1952). (Statement of Harold F. Linden, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs, Department of State.)
" See Article XXII(1) of the Friendship Treaty which states:
The term "national treatment" means treatment accorded within the territories
of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in
like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or other objects, as the
case may be, of such Party.
Friendship Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2079.
" See Article XXII(2) of the Friendship Treaty, which states:
The term "most-favored-nation treatment" means treatment accorded within
the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment ac-
corded therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or
other objects, as the case may be, of any third country.
Id. art. XXII(2), 4 U.S.T. at 2079.
14 In the United States, provisions of a treaty supersede inconsistent state laws. Missouri
v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). An act of Congress can negate provisions of a treaty, how-
ever, under the concept of "last expression of sovereign will." See Chinese Exclusion Cases,
130 U.S. 581 (1889). Since title VII was passed by Congress in 1964 and the Friendship
Treaty was signed in 1953, it could be argued that title VII provisions supersede any incon-
sistent provisions in the Friendship Treaty.
" See Walker, Modern Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 42 MINN. L.
REV. 805, 817-22 (1958).
18 For instance, the Friendship Treaty contains provisions governing antitrust (art.
XIV(4)), expropriation of property (art. VI(3)), and taxes (art. XI(1)-(5)). The following
treaties are some of the friendship treaties negotiated after World War II: Treaty of Friend-
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Article VIII(l) of the Friendship Treaty provided for the employ-
ment of personnel selected by nationals and foreign companies; 1
there were no significant controversies concerning this particular
article of the Friendship Treaty from 1953 until 1964.20
However, when the United States Congress passed title VII of
the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the possibility for substantive contro-
versy ripened. Title VII prohibits an employer from hiring, firing,
or otherwise discriminating against an individual because of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.2 1 An employer is defined as a
"person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen
or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. '22 The
term "industry affecting commerce" is defined by title VII under
the disclosure terms of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA). s The NLRA has been interpreted to cover foreign
employers.24
The problems in reconciling title VII's policy with the Friend-
ship Treaty provisions have usually occurred in defining particular
kinds of discrimination.25 For example, title VII prohibits national
ship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 29, 1954, United States-West Germany, 7 U.S.T.
1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Dec. 26, 1951,
United States-Greece, 5 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; and Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation, Aug. 23, 1951, United States-Israel, 5 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2448.
A complete pre-1962 list of these friendship treaties can be found at 1 I.L.M. 92 (1962). The
treaties had the common purpose of furthering Western economic and social alliance. See
Commercial Treaties: Hearing on Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with
Israel, Ethiopia, Italy, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Germany, and Japan Before the Sub-
comm. on the Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., at 3-17 (1953).
Friendship Treaty, supra note 2, art. VIII(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2070.
o The lack of controversy could have been attributed to restrictions placed by some
states on the number of noncitizens who could be employed in a domestic branch or subsidi-
ary. These restrictions tended to slow foreign investment in the United States economy. See
Note, Commercial Treaties and the American Civil Rights Law: The Case of Japanese
Employers, 31 STAN. L. REV. 947, 952-53 (1979).
21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
22 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
"3 29 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976). "'Industry affecting commerce' means any activity, business,
or industry in commerce or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or
the free flow of commerce." Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Grif-
fin) Act § 3(c), 29 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1976).
" See Delta Match Corp., 102 N.L.R.B. 1400 (1953) (NLRA applies to the wholly owned
United States subsidiary of foreign corporation); The Royal Bank of Canada (San Juan
Branch), 67 N.L.R.B. 403 (1946) (NLRA applies to United States branch of foreign
corporation).
26 The precise scope of title VII is unclear. Initially, there was an extensive debate on
whether title VII protection should be extended to a majority group supposedly possessing
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origin discrimination, but, for many years, it remained unresolved
whether this statutory prohibition included national citizenship
discrimination. In 1973, the Supreme Court in Espinoza v. Farah
Manufacturing Co. 26 ruled that in enacting title VII Congress had
not intended to include national citizenship within the meaning of
national origin.2 7 Under Espinoza, an employer preferring United
States citizenship in executive or managerial hiring would not be
guilty of employment discrimination. 6 Other title VII employment
discrimination cases decided by the Supreme Court have resolved
other related domestic issues concerning preference hiring. In Mc-
Donald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co.,29 the Supreme
Court ruled that whites as a race are not exempt from title VII
anti-discrimination coverage.30 In Dothard v. Rawlinson,31 the
Court ruled that physical appearance alone should not be a deter-
mining factor in job qualifications.3 2 Although dealing with seem-
all the benefits of society in the United States. "[T]he Act does not command that any
person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he
is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or ma-
jority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971).
26 414 U.S. 86 (1973).
27 Espinoza involved a Mexican national who filed a title VII action against a United
States employer claiming that the employer refused to hire her because of her national citi-
zenship. The Court based its analysis on a reading of the legislative history of title VII, and
rejected an interpretative guideline issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), which included national citizenship within the definition of national origin. Id.
at 89-92.
8 Sumitomo Shoji America developed three basic defenses in its answer to the Avigliano
complaint. First, title VII did not cover national citizenship discrimination as previously
litigated in Espinoza. Second, Sumitomo Shoji America asserted its independent right as a
wholly owned subsidiary of its Japanese parent to invoke article VIII(1) of the Friendship
Treaty. Third, the Friendship Treaty precluded a title VII attack through the federal ad-
ministrative regulations of 22 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (1982) granting "treaty trader" status to
Japanese nationals who were executives or supervisors. Reply Brief for Petitioner and Cross
-Respondent at 1, 10, 19. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct.
2374 (1982).
- 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
" McDonald concerned an employer who had discharged two white employees for theft
while retaining a third black employee implicated in the theft. The Supreme Court not only
reasserted the Griggs doctrine, but also stated that section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866 covered "whites" as well as other races. See infra note 33. McDonald's impact may
have been lessened by the decision in United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), which held that voluntary affirmative action is an acceptable
method to assure minority participation under title VII.
"' 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
"Dothard concerned a woman who was denied a job as a prison guard because of her sex
and small stature. The Supreme Court ruled that requirements for a position must be suffi-
ciently job-related in order to avoid title VII sanctions. The Equal Employment Opportu-
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ingly dissimilar fact situations, these cases help to define the limits
of the judiciary's application of title VII to the field of national
citizenship discrimination."3
The clash between title VII and the Friendship Treaty formally
occurred in 1978 when the female plaintiffs3 4 in Avigliano filed
their class action suit alleging employment discrimination under ti-
tle VII.3 5 The defendant was a United States subsidiary 6 of a sogo
nity Commission (EEOC) has codified this holding in 29 C.F.R. § 1606.6(a)(2) (1982).
33 The Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas developed a three-part test to govern title
VII violations. The first question asks whether plaintiffs have established a prima facie case
of employment discrimination. If a prima facie case has been shown, the burden shifts to
the employer to justify the employment practice in question. If the employer can justify the
employment practice, plaintiffs must then show that alternative selection devices exist that
would serve the employer's legitimate interests without discriminatory effects. McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
The Supreme Court thought it necessary to clarify the employer's burden of proof regard-
ing the extent of justification necessary to shift the burden back to the plaintiff. The Court
ruled that an employer does not have to justify an employment practice by a preponderance
of the evidence but only has to explain the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the
existence of the practice. In other words, the employer only has to meet a burden of produc-
tion. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). The
eleven plaintiffs were United States citizens except for one Japanese national. An amicus
curiae brief in support of the Avigliano position was filed by the EEOC. Sumitomo Shoji
America filed counterclaims charging abuse of process and intentional infliction of economic
damages. A motion by Avigliano to dismiss the counterclaims was denied by the district
court. Id. at 516.
35 The plaintiffs in Avigliano originally filed a section 1981 claim with the contested title
VII claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) states:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be par-
ties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
The section 1981 claim in Avigliano was dismissed by the district court, which held that
neither sex discrimination nor national origin discrimination was pertinent under that sec-
tion. Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 513 (1979) citing Jones v.
United Gas Improvement Corp., 68 F.R.D. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1975). The Supreme Court previously
had indirectly precluded the use of section 1981 for sex or religious discrimination. See Run-
yon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167-69 (1976).
The litigation interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 has centered around the meaning given to the
word "white". Some courts have allowed suits by Hispanics. See Enriquez v. Honeywell,
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 901 (W.D. Okla. 1977). However, other courts have dismissed suits by
Slavs. See Budinsky v. Corning Glass Works, 425 F. Supp. 786 (W.D. Pa. 1977). For a thor-
ough discussion of the relationship among the various Civil Rights Acts, Friendship Treaty
prerogatives, and the United States Constitution, see, supra, note 20.
A subsidiary is a company separate but affiliated with the parent company, while a
branch is an extension of the parent. Factors in determining separateness from the parent
include: (a) the business transactions of the two entities, (b) separation of corporate proce-
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shosha, a Japanese version of an export trading company.37 The
district court applied an analysis developed through domestic pre-
cedent to conclude that Sumitomo was a United States subsidiary
and was, therefore, covered by title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. In contrast, the appellate court analyzed Avigliano with an
approach similar to that followed by the International Court of
Justice (I.C.J.) in its deliberations and held that Sumitomo Shoji
America had standing to assert the Friendship Treaty, but that ti-
tle VII still applied to Japanese firms doing business in the United
States. 8
The Supreme Court applied its own methodology to Avagliano,
utilizing the district court and appellate court approaches to reach
the same conclusion as the district court.3 9 After summarizing the
course of the litigation in the opening section of the opinion, the
Court discussed the limits of treaty construction 40 noting that
dures, (c) financial structure of the two entities, and (d) the public image of the nature of
the separation. See HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS, § 148 (2d ed. 1970).
"' Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374 (1982). A sogo
shosha, (usually accompanied by the words shoji, bussan, or boecki in its official name),
controls all of the contact a foreign enterprise makes with Japanese interests. To call a sogo
shosha a "trading company" is underestimating its importance and power since not only
does a sogo shosha deal with the usual import/export function, but it also provides other
activities like marketing, finance, engineering, and technical consultation. ARTHUR ANDER-
SEN AND COMPANY, TAX AND TRADE GUIDE: JAPAN, § 2.10 (1972).
" Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 512-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 558-59 (2d Cir. 1981). The opinion
asserts that the words "of their choice" in article VIII(1) of the Friendship Treaty were
chosen in order to overcome restrictions placed on foreign nationals by local United States
law and not to allow Japanese firms to hire workers of their choice. The appellate court
analogized to the Child Labor Act, asserting that the United States would not want
Japanese firms employing children just because the Friendship Treaty did not expressly
prohibit it.
" The Avigliano decision demonstrates the various ways to resolve a treaty provision
problem. The district court analysis focuses on factors such as: (a) the definitional section of
the treaty; (b) the traditional "hornbook" rules of law relating to the subject matter; and (c)
United States judicial precedent. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co., 494 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (anti-dumping provision); In re Fotochrome,
Inc., 377 F. Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), affd sub nom. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517
F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975) (bankruptcy provisions).
The I.C.J. prefers a methodology based on article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. That methodology bases treaty analysis on such factors as the text of the
treaty, subjective intentions of the parties to the treaty, declared objects or purposes of the
treaty, written agreements supplementing the official treaty, and subsequent practice of the
parties to a treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/
27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
40 In a footnote, the Supreme Court expressed the view that each treaty must be analyzed
separately to ascertain the negotiating histories. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,
- U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2380 n. 12 (1982). A reluctance to set precedent-breaking guide-
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treaty language controls unless the words of the treaty conflict
with the expectations of the parties.41 The Court then looked at
the "definitional" section of article XXII(3) of the Friendship
Treaty and interpreted that provision as making Sumitomo Shoji
America a company of the United States operating under the laws
of New York, rather than a Japanese corporation.4 The Court re-
ferred to letters from both the governments of Japan43 and the
United States" to support its interpretation." The remainder of
the opinion was devoted to a discussion of the development of a
lines in the field of employment discrimination under the guise of treaty interpretation was
possibly one of the reasons that the Supreme Court failed to follow Linskey v. Heidelberg
Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). That case involved a title VII claim
against a United States subsidiary of a Danish corporation. Although the court in Linskey
used a mode of treaty interpretation similar to that used by the Supreme Court, it con-
cluded that both the parent and the subsidiary could be liable for employment discrimina-
tion under title VII citing treaty trader rules. Id. at 1187. The treaty trader rules are dis-
cussed infra notes 71-75.
41 The Supreme Court relied upon Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963).
Maximov dealt with the Convention on Double Taxation, Apr. 16, 1945, United States-
Great Britain, arts. I, 11(3), XIV, 60 Stat. 1377, 1377-79, T.I.A.S. 1546. Justice Goldberg in
the Maximov opinion asserted: "It is particularly inappropriate for a court to sanction a
deviation from the clear impact of a solemn treaty between this Nation and a foreign sover-
eign when as here, there is no indication that application of the words of the treaty accord-
ing to their obvious meaning effect a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of
its signatories." Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. at 54.
" Friendship Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXII(3), 4 U.S.T. at 2079-80.
43 Diplomatic Communication from the Embassy of Japan in Washington to the United
States Department of State (Apr. 21, 1982), quoted in, Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2379 n. 9 (1982).
"' Letter from James R. Atwood, Deputy Legal Adviser, United States Department of
State, to Lutz Alexander Prager, Assistant General Counsel, EEOC (Sept. 1, 1979), re-
printed in 74 Am. J. INT'L L. 158, 158-59 (1980).
An earlier State Department letter had interpreted article VIII(1) of the Friendship
Treaty as permitting United States subsidiaries of Japanese companies to staff their execu-
tive positions with Japanese nationals. Letter from Lee R. Marks, Deputy Legal Adviser,
United States Department of State, to Abner W. Sibal, General Counsel, EEOC (Oct. 17,
1978), reprinted in 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 281, 282-84 (1979). The Supreme Court dismissed the
impact of this letter in interpreting the original intent of the signatories to the Friendship
Treaty by stating that the letter was merely evidence of a later interpretation by the State
Department. Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2379
(1982).
4' The Court cited Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961), to justify the use of
outside memoranda. Kolovrat dealt with the Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 2-14, 1881, United
States-Serbia, arts. 1-3, 22 Stat. 963, 963-64, T.S. No. 319. Plaintiff, a citizen of Yugoslavia,
claimed the estate of a relative who had died in the United States. Oregon, where the prop-
erty of the deceased was located, asserted escheatment under an "alien succession" law. The
Supreme Court, in ruling for the plaintiff, relied heavily on memoranda from the Serbian
treaty negotiations and on correspondence betweel Yugoslavia and the United States based
on the Agreement on Settlement of Pecuniary Claims Against Yugoslavia, July 19, 1948,
United States-Yugoslavia, art. V, 62 Stat. 2658, T.I.A.S. No. 1803.
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
treaty as a commercial agreement." The Court compared the trea-
ties written during the 18th and 19th centuries47 with those written
before 4  and after's World War II. Finally, the Court rejected the
argument that local subsidiaries unduly suffer by not being able to
use the same employment practices as the foreign company or a
branch of that foreign company.50
The Avagliano Court resolved the case by simply determining
what it thought was the proper interpretation of article VIII(l) of
the Friendship Treaty. This approach enabled the Court to avoid
the more difficult problems of: (1) the applicability of certain na-
tional citizenship criteria to the two major employment discrimina-
tion sections of the Civil Rights Act;51 (2) the exception of the
bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) based upon a claim of
national citizenship employment discrimination;" (3) the applica-
bility of the civil rights law, or any United States law, to a United
States branch, or even the parent company, of a foreign enterprise;
and (4) the standing of a subsidiary to assert rights of its parent
under a treaty.53 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court seemed to sug-
gest possible solutions to these problems.'4
" Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2380-82 (1982).
41 Id. at 2380.
4" Id. at 2381.
" Id. at 2380. Friendship treaties seem to have fallen into disfavor; only eight nations
have signed such treaties with the United States since 1962. See I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, 4
U.S.T. CUMULATIVE INDEX, 1950-1970: CUMULATIVE INDEX TO UNITED STATES TREATIES ANT)
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS SUBJECT INDEX 1950-1970 (1973).
50 Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2381 (1982).
6, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 2000e (1976).
82 A bona fide occupational qualification [hereinafter referred to as BFOQ] is defined as a
qualification "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of a particular business or en-
terprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
8 The question of standing arises if the party seeking relief does not appear to have a
personal stake in the outcome of the litigation as to assure a true adversary position. Stand-
ing is not the same as justiciability, which relates to the merits of the particular case. See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
A companion case of Avigliano was Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 469 F. Supp. 1
(S.D. Tex. 1979), rev'd, 643 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct.
984 (1982). Both cases dealt with the same Friendship Treaty issues. The district court in
Avigliano quoted the district court in Spiess on the question of the coverage of title VII to
foreign owned subsidiaries operating in the United States. The appeals court in Spiess
quoted the appeals court in Avigliano, but the result reached by Spiess was directly oppo-
site that of Avigliano. The appeals court in Spiess ruled that the Itoh subsidiary was cov-
ered by the Friendship Treaty and therefore, was exempt from title VII regulations.
The Fifth Circuit in Speiss cited five basic reasons for its disagreement with the Second
Circuit in Avigliano on the issue of title VII coverage. First, the Spiess court criticized the
failure of the Avigliano court to account for the unique nature of an international agree-
ment which represents a common ground between two cultures rather than a common con-
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The Supreme Court did not resolve the particular national citi-
zenship question arising in Avagliano." Nevertheless, the Court
cited Espinoza for the proposition that title VII prohibits discrimi-
nation on the basis of citizenship "wherever it has the purpose or
effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin." ' The dis-
trict court therefore, possibly could adjudicate on remand the issue
of whether the employment discrimination allegedly practiced by
Sumitomo Shoji America was sufficient to bring an action under
title VII. 57 Alternatively, Congress could decide to amend title VII
to include national citizenship in section 2000e-2(a) and thereby
make the issue moot for later adjudication.
The Supreme Court avoided a direct ruling on the validity of the
sensus, as is the case with domestic legislation. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d
at 356. Second, it cited the differences between the "civil" and "functional" capacities of
companies saying that "civil" incorporation provisions of treaties should not be confused
with "functional" employment rights outside a treaty. Id. at 357 (quoting Walker, supra
note 8, at 380). Third, it said that the Avigliano court failed to ascertain the history of the
Friendship Treaty which was devised to provide a stable environment for private interna-
tional investment. Foreign nationals were to receive not only "equal" protection but also
"preferential" protection under international law in case of possible government lapse
against its own citizens. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 643 F.2d at 359-60 (quoting
Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present
United States Practice, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 229, 231-32 (1956)). Fourth, the use of the phrase
"of their choice" in article VIII(1) of the Friendship Treaty created an absolute rule permit-
ting foreign nationals to control their overseas investments. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co.
(America), 643 F.2d at 360. Fifth, the Spiess court cited the lack of congressional intent to
extend title VII coverage to treaties, as demonstrated by the legislative history. Id. at 362
(citing McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marienos de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963)
(subsequent federal legislation will invalidate treaty obligations if the congressional intent
to do so is clearly expressed)).
M See Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2377 (1982).
In approving the writ of certiorari for Avigliano, the Court noted the necessity for the
United States to speak as "one people, one nation, one power" in its relations with foreign
nations, and of the need to clarify the rights of foreign investors to staff their enterprises
with key personnel of their choice. The Court also referred to the need to clarify the param-
eters of the "treaty trader" provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. Avig-
liano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S.
962 (1981).
" 414 U.S. 86 (1973). The Supreme Court stated that the district court relied upon Espi-
noza in its reasoning. There is no reference to Espinoza, however, in the district court
opinion.
In Espinoza, the Supreme Court ruled against the direct application of title VII to citi-
zenship discrimination cases. The basic import of Espinoza is to allow discrimination
against someone who is not a resident of the United States, so long as that discrimination is
not based on his or her national origin. The Espinoza decision has been codified in 29
C.F.R. § 1606.5(a) (1982).
". Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2382 n. 19
(1982).
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BFOQ. The Court in Avagliano expressed the opinion that knowl-
edge of the Japanese language, culture, customs, and business
practices might be needed for the management of a Japanese sub-
sidiary. 8 It is possible that Sumitomo Shoji America could claim a
BFOQ exemption from title VII on the basis of the Avagliano
Court's discussion of BFOQ exemptions. 9 The only significant case
dealing with BFOQ guidelines in the national citizenship area was
a pre-title VII New York state court ruling in American Jewish
Congress v. Carters0 interpreting a state BFOQ statute. The plain-
tiff organization in American Jewish Congress claimed its mem-
bers were discriminated against by defendant Arabian American
Oil Company (ARAMCO) because of the members' religious and
cultural background. The New York County Supreme Court elimi-
nated the exemption from BFOQ coverage granted by a state dis-
crimination commission in holding the plaintiff had a valid com-
plaint against ARAMCO under the state BFOQ statute."1
American Jewish Congress was not cited by an Avigliano court.6 2
The Supreme Courtoevidently saw no reason to become involved
with the United States law/foreign company issue or the standing
issue, having decided Avagliano through treaty interpretation."'
The lower courts in Avigliano attempted to address these two re-
" Although Espinoza litigated the issue of whether an employer could discriminate on
the basis of United States citizenship, it did not decide whether an employer could discrimi-
nate on the basis of foreign citizenship. Sumitomo Shoji America could have asserted a de-
fense based on voluntary affirmative action and the need to develop more Oriental manage-
ment talent in the United States. See Note, supra note 20, at 965-67.
The EEOC has chosen to limit the scope of the BFOQ. See 29 C.F.R. § 1606.4 (1982) ("A
BFOQ shall be strictly construed.").
69 The lower courts have developed a two-pronged test to evaluate the feasibility of a
BFOQ exemption. The BFOQ exemption claimant must prove: (1) the BFOQ exemption is
necessary to the essence of its business, and (2) there is a factual basis or reasonable cause
to believe that all persons within the class would be unable to perform safely or effectively
the duties of the job involved. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, 531 F.2d 224, 235-36 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 976 (1976).
" 19 Misc.2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct. 1959), af'd and modified, 10 A.D.2d 833,
199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1960), a/I'd, 9 N.Y.2d 223, 213 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1961).
" American Jewish Congress v. Carter, 19 Misc.2d 205, 190 N.Y.S.2d 218, 223 (Sup. Ct.
1959).
62 A more effective method of dealing with international employment discrimination
could be developing with the implementation of the Export Administration Act of 1979, 50
U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. IV 1980), which gives the President of the United States
the power to respond to situations stemming from economic or political boycotts initiated
by foreign governments. The amendments were passed in response to the Arab boycott of
1973 against firms dealing with Israel. These regulations would seem to have application in
both hostile and peaceful conflicts. See 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401, 2402 (Supp. IV 1980).
63 Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 2382 (1982).
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lated issues in their respective opinions."' The district court had
cited United States v. R.P. Oldham,6 5 a case involving the first im-
portant interpretation of the Friendship Treaty, to hold that
Sumitomo Shoji America had no independent standing to raise the
Friendship Treaty in defense of the title VII action." In a foot-
note, the district court stated that the employment discrimination
issue did not affect the parent.6 7 The district court also noted the
inapplicability of Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,"
and the assertion in that case concerning the right of a subsidiary
to raise an issue affecting the rights of its parent when the treaty
rights of the parent may be affected by a decision against the
subsidiary. 9
Defendant Sumitomo Shoji America claimed general standing
under the "treaty trader" provision of article (I)(1) of the Friend-
ship Treaty,7 0 as interpreted in the Immigration and Nationality
" See Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 556-59 (2d Cir. 1981).
6 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
A wholly owned United States subsidiary of a Japanese corporation was indicted for
criminal conspiracy in restraint of trade under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976). The United States subsidiary claimed absolute protection under article XVIII(1) of
the Friendship Treaty. The court held that the subsidiary lacked standing to invoke the
treaty under article XXII(3). United States v. R.P. Oldham, 152 F. Supp. at 823.
7 Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976).
09 Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 510-11 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
1979). The plaintiff in Calnetics was a domestic producer of automobile air conditioners in
direct competition with defendant, Volkswagen of America. The wholly owned United
States subsidiary of the West German automobile manufacturer was found guilty in a pri-
vate action of antitrust violations under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2
(1976), the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §
18 (1976). As part of the declaratory judgment, the district court judge granted relief in the
form of a 50% quota on automobile air conditioners from the parent company in West
Germany. The court of appeals reversed the quota, noting the self-defeating purpose in cre-
ating a closed market favoring other domestic and foreign manufacturers. The friendship
treaty with West Germany and the standing of a subsidiary to raise issues affecting its par-
ent seemed only tangentially involved. The district court in Spiess distinguished Calnetics
as allowing a subsidiary to assert parental friendship treaty rights only when those rights
are affected by court ordered relief. Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co. (America), 469 F. Supp. 1, 9
(S.D. Tex. 1979).
70 Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Arti-
cle I(1) states:
Nationals of either Party shall be permitted to enter the territories of the other
Party and to remain therein: (a) for the purpose of carrying on trade between the
territories of the two Parties and engaging in related commercial activities; (b) for
the purpose of developing and directing the operations of an enterprise in which
they have invested, or in which they are actively in the process of investing, a
substantial amount of capital; and (c) for other purposes subject to the laws relat-
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Act of 195271 and the Code of Federal Regulations. 2 The treaty
trader rules are an important part of the implementing legislation
developed by Congress in response to the bilateral and multilateral
commercial treaties negotiated by the United States during the
twentieth century.73 These rules set the standards which must be
met before foreign companies and their nationals are admitted to
the United States to conduct business. 4 If the standards are met,
ing to the entry and sojourn of aliens.
Friendship Treaty, supra note 2, art. I(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2066.
" Section 101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 states:
The term "immigrant" means every alien except an alien who is within one of
the following classes of non-immigrant aliens-.
(E) an alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the
provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and
the foreign state of which he is a national . . .; (i) solely to carry on substantial
trade, principally between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a
national; ....
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)(i) (1976).
, An alien shall be classifiable as a nonimmigrant treaty trader if he establishes to
the satisfaction of the consular officer that he qualifies under the provisions of
section 101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Act and that: (1) He intends to depart from the
United States upon the termination of his status; and (2) if he is employed by a
foreign person or organization having the nationality of the treaty country which
is engaged in substantial trade as contemplated by section 101(a)(15)(E)(i), he will
be engaged in duties of a supervisory or executive character, or, if he is or will be
employed in a minor capacity, he has the specific qualifications that will make his
services essential to the efficient operation of the employer's enterprise and will
not be employed solely in an unskilled manual capacity. The employment must be
by an individual employer having the nationality of the treaty country who is
maintaining the status of a nonimmigrant treaty trader, or by an organization
which is principally owned by a person or persons having the nationality of the
treaty country and, if not residing abroad, maintaining nonimmigrant treaty
trader status.
22 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (1982).
"' In a 1974 notice announcing the proposed change in the treaty trader regulations, the
State Department emphasized its awareness of the fact that the treaty trader classification
"has been sought by and in behalf of certain aliens contemplating employment with organi-
zations owned and operated by aliens having permanent residence status in the United
States." The notice further states: "It was never intended that an alien employed by a for-
eign person or organization could qualify for classification as a treaty trader unless the em-
ployer maintained a status consistent with section 101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act." 39 Fed. Reg. 18,792 (1974) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. § 41.40) (proposed
May 10, 1974).
"" In its Supreme Court brief, Sumitomo Shoji America stressed the relevance of the
treaty trader rules to the issue of title VII coverage. The first set of treaty trader rules,
created under the terms of the Immigration Act of 1924, were developed in response to
article I(1) of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and
Japan. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 3(6), 43 Stat. 153, 155. Article I(1) gave the
alien certain rights "to carry on trade, wholesale and retail." See 1911 Treaty of Commerce
and Navigation, supra note 11, art. I(1), 37 Stat. at 1504. The Immigration Act was
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the foreign company is allowed to operate in the United States and
its nationals are granted treaty trader visas by the Immigration
Service. 75  Nevertheless, the district court refused to recognize
these regulations as pertinent to questions of standingTe and based
amended in 1932 to narrow the visa rights granted aliens "for entry solely to carry on trade
between the United States and the foreign state of which the alien is a national." See Act of
July 6, 1932, ch. 434, 47 Stat. 607, 607-08. When the current Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) was passed in 1952, the treaty trader rules were separated into the present struc-
ture of the Congressional definition found in § 101(a)(15)(E)(i) of the INA and an executive
regulatory provision integrated by the State Department under 22 C.F.R. § 41.40. Sumitomo
Shoji America claimed that the predecessor regulations to the current 22 C.F.R. § 41.40
(1982) had a much broader scope which had been narrowed to reflect the continuing opera-
tion of the Friendship Treaty. For instance, Sumitomo Shoji America claimed that the origi-
nal 1952 version of the treaty trader rules reflected article I of the Friendship Treaty, al-
though the 1959 change limiting entry to "executive or supervisory" personnel related to
article VIII(1) of the Friendship Treaty and the 1974 change limiting entry further to "exec-
utive or supervisory personnel by an organization principally owned by persons having the
nationality of the treaty country" related to article VII(I) of the Friendship Treaty. The
1974 change also extended the entry limitation to "executive or supervisory personnel by an
organization principally owned by persons having the nationality of the treaty country,"
which related to article VII(1) of the Friendship Treaty covering management control. 39
Fed. Reg. 26,154 (1974). Thus, Sumitomo Shoji America reasoned that through the changes
in the treaty trader regulations during the previous thirty years, control had been vested in
the parental enterprise thereby giving a branch or subsidiary standing to raise issues affect-
ing the parent. See Reply Brief for Petitioner and Cross Respondent at 10-13, Avigliano v.
Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., - U.S. -, 102 S.Ct. 2374 (1982).
Aliens desire treaty trader status because persons qualifying for treaty trader status avoid
the presumption that they are immigrants under 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b) (1976) and, therefore,
would not be subject to quota restrictions under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1154 (1976) and would not
be excluded or deported under 8 U.S.C. § 1102 (1976).
,B The Second Circuit regarded the last sentence of 22 C.F.R. § 41.40(a) (1982) to be the
decisive factor in interpreting the treaty provisions in Avigliano. Article XXII(3) of the
Friendship Treaty, supra note 2, 4 U.S.T. at 2079-80, was seen as relating to 22 C.F.R. §
41.40(a) (1982) under a formula devised by the State Department defining the nationality of
a corporation by the nationality of "those persons who own the principal amount (i.e., more
than 50 percent) of the stock of that corporation regardless of the place of incorporation."
Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 557 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL: PART II § 41.40 n. 8 (1961)).
,' Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 506, 512 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
Two cases decided in the late 1960's support the assertion made by the district court that
treaty trader rules are meant to determine only individual immigration status and are not
meant to define corporate nationality. These cases are mentioned in the same footnote in
the opinion. Id. See, e.g., Tokyo Sansei v. Esperdy, 298 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Nip-
pon Express, Inc. v. Esperdy, 261 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The court in Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1185 (E.D.N.Y.
1979), in accepting treaty trader status and consequent application of title VII to the entire
Danish corporation, was interpreting the Danish treaty's equivalent of article VIII(l) of the
Friendship Treaty. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Oct. 1, 1951, United
States-Denmark, 12 U.S.T. 908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797. Article VII (4) of the Danish friendship
treaty adds the words "regardless of nationality" to the following statement in the Friend-
ship Treaty: "Nationals and companies shall be permitted to engage ...specialized em-
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its holding on an analysis of article XXIII(3) of the Friendship
Treaty.""
In basic agreement with the district court, the appellate court
believed that standing under the Friendship Treaty had to be re-
solved before other issues could be addressed. Unlike the district
court, however, the appellate court declared that Sumitomo Shoji
America had standing under the Friendship Treaty to assert its
claims.7 8 The appellate court stated that the district court was in-
correct in its differentiation between subsidiaries and branches of
foreign corporations, since the purpose of the Friendship Treaty
was to protect foreign investments generally. 79 No cases were cited
to support the Second Circuit's view of unity between parent and
subsidiary under the Friendship Treaty.80 The Avigliano appellate
court also referred to a "crazy quilt pattern" of rights which would
emerge if subsidiaries were treated differently from branches of a
parent company, since Japanese branches would be given national
treatment and most favored nation rights under articles VI(4),
ployees of their choice." These words might tend to obscure the division between subsidiary
and parent and might also justify to a greater degree an exemption from title VII coverage.
Yet the Linskey court held that title VII coverage was applicable, utilizing the same ration-
ale as the court of appeals in Avigliano. See supra note 36.
77 Standing of a subsidiary to assert the rights of a parent company is an unsettled con-
cept, even where the parent company and the subsidiary are both incorporated in the
United States. See Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 560 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1977); contra
Hassell v. Harmon Foods, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 432 (W.D. Tenn. 1971), afl'd, 454 F.2d 199 (6th
Cir. 1972). These cases are particularly pertinent to the Avigliano opinions because they
deal with title VII employment discrimination.
The court in Linskey v. Heidelberg Eastern, 470 F. Supp. 1181, 1183-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)
and Baker used the following standards to determine whether a subsidiary can assert the
standing of the parent: (1) interrelation of operations, (2) common management, (3) com-
mon control of labor relations, and (4) common ownership or financial control. These stan-
dards were developed in Radio & Television Broadcast Technicians Local Union 1264 v.
Broadcast Service of Mobile, Inc., 380 U.S. 255 (1965). Conversely, the Linskey court also
asserted an agency theory whereby a parent corporation could be held liable for the employ-
ment practices of a subsidiary if the parent corporation dominates the actions of the subsid-
iary. See Woodford v. Kinney Shoe Corp., 369 F. Supp. 911 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
7s Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1981). The
Second Circuit did not reach the issue of whether Sumitomo Shoji America could assert any
rights of its parent; the precise issue involved in Calnetics.
79 Id. at 556.
" Id. Although not denominated as such, the court of appeals followed the European
"aggregate" test which examines the nationality, domicile, or residence of the individuals
controlling the corporation. In contrast, the American "entity" test considers factors such as
situs of incorporation and principal place of business. See HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW Or
CORPORATIONS § 90 (2d ed. 1970). The general movement in Europe is toward the American
"entity" test. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep.
3, 42.
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VII(l), and VII(4) while Japanese subsidiaries would be forced to
comply with American law.8 1 In delving into the history of friend-
ship treaties, the Second Circuit referred to a 1955 letter written
by the State Department to the American Embassy in the Nether-
lands addressing the proposed friendship treaty between the
United States and the Netherlands.82 The letter explained that a
foreign company is allowed to control its nationals abroad, despite
contrary appearances in the definitional provision of the proposed
friendship treaty.83 The Netherlands had wanted to include an ad-
ditional article in the friendship treaty allowing subsidiaries to as-
sert parental rights. 84 In its controversial decision on the relation-
ship between article VIII of the Friendship Treaty and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Second Circuit expressed the view
that the employment discrimination issue needed to be resolved
despite the limited nature of the interlocutory appeal process.8 5
The Second Circuit believed it had the right, and even the duty, to
express itself on other issues because of the unique nature of the
Friendship Treaty.8s
In not responding directly to the peripheral issues addressed by
the Second Circuit in Avigliano, the Supreme Court, for the pre-
sent time, may have avoided a potential international controversy
with an important economic ally. However, the employment dis-
crimination issues raised in this case will not disappear and cannot
be avoided in a world increasingly dependent on its political and
" Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 556 (2d Cir. 1981).
S Official-Informal Letter from Herman Walker, Jr., Trade Agreements and Treaty Divi-
sion, Department of State, to Counselor for Economic Affairs, American Embassy, The
Hague, Netherlands (Oct. 28, 1955), reprinted in Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc.,
638 F.2d at 557.
83 Id.
8 Id.
" Avigliano v. Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc., 638 F.2d 552, 558 n. 6 (2d Cir. 1981). In
footnote 6, the appeals court explicitly invoked its doctrine developed in Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975), of comment-
ing on issues with international implications which could conceivably be ruled upon by for-
eign tribunals. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 (1971).
The same appeals court attempted to apply these rules in IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980). The court discovered that although it might have §
12(b) subject-matter jurisdiction over the American firms, there was no effective way to
enforce a decree against the concerned foreign parties. Id. at 916-921.
The Friendship Treaty does provide for access to courts, administrative tribunals, and
agencies in order to manage commercial relations between the parties. See Friendship
Treaty, supra note 2, art. XXIII(1), 4 U.S.T. at 2076-77.
The Friendship Treaty also provides for the submission of a dispute to the International
Court of Justice. See id. art. XXIV(2), 4 U.S.T. at 2080.
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economic relationships. Unfortunately, the courts which must
eventually decide these issues will not be able to look to Avagliano
for the answers which are so greatly needed.
Henry Cyrus
